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Is the Right To Organize Unconstitutional?
Waremart Foods v. NLRB, 354 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Do union organizers have the right to organize on private property? As
far as federal law is concerned, the answer to that question is clear.
Employee organizers have broad rights under the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA); nonemployee union organizers have virtually none. Until a
recent decision by the D.C. Circuit, however, there was little reason to
believe that federal law, much less the Constitution, prevented states from
granting workplace access rights to nonemployee organizers. While the
issue had not been squarely addressed, it seemed safe to assume that state
right-to-organize laws were the type of economic regulation subject to
highly deferential constitutional review since the end of the Lochner era.
The D.C. Circuit challenged that assumption in Waremart Foods v.
NLRB (Waremart I1).1 The court overturned a National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) decision 2 holding that a nonunion supermarket had engaged
in unfair labor practices by attempting to bar union organizers from
distributing literature to consumers in the store parking lot. Although
California law appeared to protect labor-related leafleting on private
property, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that to the extent the state law afforded
special protections to labor leafleting, it was content-discriminatory in
violation of the First Amendment.3 Although the D.C. Circuit did not
directly overturn the California law-it instead "construe[d] it to avoid
unconstitutionality ' '4 at the heart of Waremart II lies the notion that laws
expressly protecting labor-related speech violate the First Amendment.
This Comment considers the sweeping implications of Waremart Irs
First Amendment analysis and takes a far more deferential view of the
constitutionality of state labor laws. Part I briefly reviews the rights of
nonemployee organizers prior to Waremart I. Part II explores the scope of
the D.C. Circuit's opinion, arguing that the court's blunt reasoning calls
into question the constitutionality of virtually all right-to-organize laws-
1. 354 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
2. Waremart Foods (Waremart 1), 337 N.L.R.B. 289 (2001), enforcement denied, 354 F.3d
870.
3. Waremart II, 354 F.3d at 874-75.
4. Id. at 875.
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including provisions of the NLRA itself. Part III suggests an alternative
analysis of the California law that is both more faithful to First Amendment
principles and less threatening to state economic regulation.
I
As currently interpreted by the Supreme Court, federal labor law offers
few protections for nonemployee union organizers. The text of the NLRA
does not mention nonemployee organizers at all, providing only that
"[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations."5 Although the Court made clear early on that the
rights of nonemployees under the NLRA were limited,6 the NLRB's
interpretations shifted over time, and by the late 1980s nonemployee
organizers enjoyed not insignificant rights to organize in private
workplaces.7 But the Supreme Court put a virtual end to that in 1992,
clarifying in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB that, "[a]s a rule,",8 the NLRA does
not compel private employers to let nonemployee organizers on their
property, subject only to very "narrow" exceptions. 9
First Amendment protection for nonemployee organizing on private
property has followed a similar trajectory. In Amalgamated Food
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., the Court held that
union organizers had a First Amendment right to picket in privately owned
shopping malls.1° Only eight years later, however, the Court overruled
Logan Valley Plaza in Hudgens v. NLRB and held that "the constitutional
guarantee of free expression has no part to play" in cases involving labor
picketing at private places of business."'
Despite the Court's retreat from a federal right to organize on private
property, before Waremart H it appeared that states were free to extend
workplace access rights to nonemployee organizers. As the Supreme Court
had expressly noted, even after Lechmere nothing in the NLRA guaranteed
employers the right to exclude nonemployee organizers from their property;
this right came from state property law.12 Meanwhile, Lechmere's holding
that the NLRA contained virtually no protections for nonemployees seemed
5. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000) (emphasis added).
6. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956).
7. See Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988), abrogated by Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,
502 U.S. 527 (1992).
8. 502 U.S. at 533.
9. Id. at 539 (citing Babcock& Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. at 113).
10. 391 U.S. 308 (1968), abrogated by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
11. 424U.S.at521.
12. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 217 n.21 (1994) ("The right of
employers to exclude union organizers from their private property emanates from state common
law, and while this right is not superseded by the NLRA, nothing in the NLRA expressly
protects it.").
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to cut against the notion that state laws granting rights to nonemployees
would be preempted by the NLRA. 3
Before Waremart II, the First Amendment seemed to present even less
of a threat to state workplace access laws than did NLRA preemption. In
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a
California Supreme Court decision holding that the right to leaflet in
shopping malls was protected by free speech provisions of the state
constitution. 14 The mall owners argued that California's protection of
picketing on private property violated the mall owners' First Amendment
rights, compelling them to endorse messages with which they disagreed.
The Court was unmoved. As Justice Marshall observed in his concurrence,
the ability of states to regulate access to private property beyond the level
set by federal law seemed compelled by the negative precedent of Lochner
v. New York.15 The alternative would be the untenable proposition "that the
common law of trespass is not subject to revision by the State."'
16
II
Against this backdrop, the Waremart II court's analysis of California
labor law is extraordinary. Below, the NLRB had reasoned that a California
statute, the Moscone Act, protected picketing and leafleting related to labor
disputes; it thus found that Lechmere did not control, and that it was an
unfair labor practice for the supermarket to try to remove the organizers.17
13. See NLRB v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080, 1095 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a California law
permitting labor picketing on private property was not preempted by the NLRA). But see Rum
Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 971 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir. 1992) (overturning on preemption
grounds a West Virginia law prohibiting police from enforcing trespass laws against striking
workers). For an argument that the Supreme Court preemption precedents followed in Calkins,
rather than those followed in Rum Creek, should apply to state workplace access laws, see
Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unionization,
7 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 416-18 (1990). In Waremart, the employer made an unsuccessful
preemption argument before the NLRB. See Waremart Foods (Waremart 1), 337 N.L.R.B. 289,
289 (2001). In overruling the NLRB on other grounds, the D.C. Circuit made no mention of the
Board's preemption analysis. See Waremart Foods v. NLRB (Waremart I), 354 F.3d 870
(D.C. Cir. 2004).
14. 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (affirming Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341
(Cal. 1979)). Just three years before the California Supreme Court's decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court had decided Hudgens, ending federal constitutional protection for picketing in malls. See
424 U.S. 507. California simply retained pre-Hudgens First Amendment law under the state
constitution. The state court decision, which remains good law, granted a state constitutional right
to leaflet in shopping malls, not in stand-alone supermarkets, and so did not control Waremart II.
15. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 93 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905)).
16. Id.
17. Waremart I, 337 N.L.R.B. at 292-93. The Moscone Act bars California courts from
enjoining labor picketing. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.3 (West 1979). Absent a legal right to
do so, an attempt to remove union leafleters constitutes interference, restraint, or coercion of the
right to organize and form unions. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (2000).
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The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that the leading California case
interpreting the Moscone Act, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County
District Council of Carpenters,18 was no longer good law to the extent it
"rested on the Moscone Act's special protection for labor activity."19 Citing
two U.S. Supreme Court cases, Police Department v. Mosley and Carey v.
Brown, the court asserted that such special protections "constituted content
discrimination in violation of the First Amendment., 20 If the issue were to
arise again, the D.C. Circuit reasoned, California courts would construe the
law to avoid unconstitutionality by removing the special protections. It thus
held that "under California law labor organizing -activities may be
conducted on private property only to the extent that California permits
other expressive activity to be conducted on private property.",
21
Buried within its complex opinion, the D.C. Circuit's brief First
Amendment analysis is sweeping. The court assumed that Mosley and
Carey squarely controlled, and thus made little attempt to articulate what in
particular it was about the protection of labor-related consumer handbilling
that violated the First Amendment. On the contrary, the opinion expanded
the set of special protections it would hold unconstitutional beyond those
involved in the case at hand, suggesting that all laws protecting "labor
organizing activities" violate the First Amendment unless they extend the
same protections to "other expressive activity." 22 Even more strikingly, the
D.C. Circuit declined to weigh the California law's objectives against its
supposed speech restrictions or, indeed, to consider the law's purpose at all.
The mere fact that the law discriminated on the basis of content was enough
to render it unconstitutional.
Taken at face value, the D.C. Circuit's reasoning would seem to
invalidate all state laws expanding the rights of nonemployee organizers.
The court did not rely on the fact that the Moscone Act gave union
organizers special rights to distribute literature to the public; it suggested
that any law permitting "organizing activities" at private workplaces would
be content-discriminatory, and thus unconstitutional, unless it granted the
same rights to the public at large. Under this logic, even a law that granted
union organizers access to workplaces in order to discuss the benefits of
joining a union with -employees would raise First Amendment concerns.
Waremart 11 thus appears to constitutionalize the Supreme Court's holding
in Lechmere, and to close off the states' ability to extend organizing rights
beyond the level set by the NLRA.
18. 599 P.2d 676 (Cal. 1979).
19. Waremart Foods v. NLRB (Waremart II), 354 F.3d 870, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
20. Id. at 875 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466 (1980); and Police Dep't v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95,(1972)).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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Indeed, read for all it is worth, Waremart II does even more than this: It
also calls into question the constitutionality of the NLRA itself. After all,
Lechmere took away organizing rights only from nonemployee organizers,
leaving intact the settled doctrine that, under the NLRA, employees are
guaranteed free access to speak and distribute literature about union
activities during nonworking time and in nonworking areas.23 An employee
seeking to communicate with coworkers on topics other than unionization,
however-views on a political candidate,24 for instance, or a taste for
pornography25 -can be restricted from doing so. Thus, the NLRA
discriminates in favor of union-related speech on the basis of its content-
and would therefore appear to be unconstitutional under the sweeping logic
of Waremart II.
Of course, the D.C. Circuit did not intend to challenge the
constitutionality of the NLRA. That its reasoning does, however, points to
the necessity of finding narrower ways to analyze the constitutionality of
state right-to-organize laws.
III
To begin with, Mosley and Carey need not have controlled Waremart
II. Both cases involved city ordinances exempting labor organizations from
general prohibitions against demonstrating on public sidewalks-in Mosley,
sidewalks in front of schools during school hours, and in Carey, sidewalks
in front of private residences. The Moscone Act could easily have been
distinguished on the ground that, in permitting labor-related speech on
private property, it does not prohibit other forms of speech as did the
ordinances in Mosley and Carey. Indeed, those cases relied on the public
forum doctrine-a doctrine that, at least since Hudgens, has been applied
only to regulations of speech on public property.26
Abandoning the public forum framework would not in itself free the
Moscone Act from constitutional doubt. There are certainly some limits on
the ability of state governments to favor certain types of speech over others
on private property. For example, a law permitting demonstrations in
private supermarket parking lots, but only if the demonstrations concerned
23. See STEPHEN I. SCHLOSSBERG & JUDITH A. SCOTT, ORGANIZING AND THE LAW 52-53
(4th ed. 1991).
24. Cf Gill v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. of Mo., 906 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that
an employer could legally fire a worker for supporting a particular congressional candidate).
25. Cf Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(granting an injunction against the display of pornography in a workplace in response to a hostile
work environment claim).
26. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001); Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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environmental issues, would seem to raise serious First Amendment
problems. 27 The hard questions, obscured by the D.C. Circuit's sweeping
reasoning, are what distinguishes such a law from ordinary labor laws such
as the NLRA, and on which side of the First Amendment line the Moscone
Act falls.
One way of making this distinction would be to borrow from public
forum reasoning and treat laws opening up private property to public
demonstrations as creating "limited public fora." When Mosley and Carey
were decided, public forum analysis was still in its infancy, 28 and the
opinions did not distinguish among the three contemporary categories:
traditional public fora, limited public fora, and nonpublic fora.2 9 However,
in finding content discrimination to be virtually dispositive of
unconstitutionality, these cases appear to fit best within the "traditional
public forum" category, for only there must content-discriminatory speech
regulations undergo strict scrutiny.30 Indeed, the Carey Court explained its
decision by reciting the canonical formulation of the traditional public
forum: "'Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions. '
31
Unlike streets and parks, private workplaces are hardly traditional
venues for free speech. Laws opening up workplaces to public
demonstrations are better seen as creating limited public fora, where
content-discriminatory laws are analyzed more deferentially. "When the
State establishes a limited public forum, the State is not required to and
does not allow persons to engage in every type of speech. The State may be
justified 'in reserving [its forum] for certain groups or for the discussion of
certain topics."' 32 As applied to public property, the limited public forum
doctrine has received a great deal of criticism as being underprotective of
speech33 and underdeterminative of constitutionality.34 The chief problem
27. I thank Nathan Newman of the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. for this hypothetical.
28. Indeed, Mosley was the first case in which a majority of the Court adopted the phrase.
See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public
Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1731 (1987).
29. See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (describing these three categories).
30. Content-discriminatory laws are never per se unconstitutional, even in traditional public
fora. They are merely subject to heightened scrutiny, and are sometimes upheld. See, e.g., Burson
v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (finding a compelling state interest in banning campaign
solicitation within a polling place).
31. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980) (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515
(1939) (Roberts, J.)).
32. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) (quoting Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)) (alteration in original).
33. See, e.g., Post, supra note 28, at 1745-58.
34. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Comment: Principles,
Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARv. L. REV. 84, 98-99 (1998).
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seems to be that if the scope of speech allowed in a limited public forum is
determined by the purposes for which the state opens it up, it is difficult to
see how a state's assertion that a particular form of speech is beyond the
scope of the forum can be challenged. 5 In the case of a regulation that
opens up private property for public speech, however, this problem seems
less severe. Unlike public property, which governments often control by
managerial authority, private property will ordinarily be opened up for
speech by statute. Determining whether statutes accord with First
Amendment principles is more straightforward than discerning whether a
government has managed its property constitutionally.
36
Analyzing the Moscone Act in light of limited public forum principles
would have focused attention on the real issues at stake in Waremart II.
Laws regulating speech in limited public fora "must not discriminate
against speech on the basis of viewpoint" and "must be 'reasonable in light
of the purpose served by the forum.' 37 The Moscone Act does not appear
to be viewpoint-discriminatory. In protecting the right to leaflet concerning
a labor dispute, the law seems to guarantee the rights of workers opposing
union campaigns, as well as those supporting them, to make their views
known; of course, it also does not prevent management from using its own
property to speak out against unions. More importantly, the law does not
permit anyone to leaflet about labor issues on private property unless they
are involved in a labor dispute with the property owner. Thus, expressing a
particular viewpoint regarding a labor dispute is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for enjoying the Moscone Act's protections.38 This
suggests that the Act's purpose is not to favor people expressing prolabor
political views. Instead, the purpose of the law seems to be to provide labor
with a legal resource that can be used to augment its power vis-a-vis
management.39 In short, the Moscone Act is a bona fide labor regulation.
To treat it as viewpoint-discriminatory and therefore presumptively
unconstitutional would be to subvert the post-Lochner tradition of
constitutional deference to economic regulations.
35. See Post, supra note 28, at 1757. Despite Post's dire account, challenges to speech
restrictions in limited public fora have frequently succeeded. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S.
98; see also id. at 107 (citing cases).
36. See Post, supra note 28, at 1782-84.
37. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
38. In contrast, in the case of the hypothetical law permitting environmental demonstrations
in supermarket parking lots, expressing a proenvironment viewpoint is a sufficient condition for
enjoying the law's protection.
39. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.3(a) (West 1979) (stating that the purpose of the statute
is "to promote the rights of workers to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining, picketing or other mutual aid or protection"). For an argument that the absence of
speech-discriminatory purpose should be dispositive of constitutionality under the First
Amendment, see Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001).
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The Moscone Act's character as a labor regulation also speaks to its
reasonableness in light of the purposes of the private property. At first
blush, the Act seems troubling on this score. In Waremart II, the union
members were handing out leaflets to the general public calling for
consumers to boycott the store. It is not immediately obvious that publicly
urging boycotts is a reasonable use of someone else's private property.
However, the targeting of nonunionized stores by unions is an established
organizing tactic,40 and one that is explicitly countenanced by the NLRA.4 1
Furthermore, existing law defines the term "labor dispute" used in the
Moscone Act as including boycotts of rival, nonunionized shops, provided
the nonunionized shops are in the same industry.42 Given that the Moscone
Act facilitates the ability of unions to employ established organizing tactics,
the Act would seem to be as reasonable as other laws, such as the NLRA,
that protect those same tactics.
Even if the facts of Waremart I leave residual First Amendment
doubts, the D.C. Circuit's sweeping indictment of laws giving special
protection to "organizing activities" is unwarranted. Laws permitting union
organizers to speak to employees should probably not be seen as creating
public fora of any sort-limited or otherwise--or, indeed, as implicating
the First Amendment at all. Instead, they should be treated as the ordinary
economic regulations that they are and subjected only to deferential rational
basis review. In any case, even under a limited public forum analysis, such
ordinary right-to-organize laws would clearly be reasonable in light of the
purposes of workplaces. To say otherwise would be to deny the legitimacy
of labor unionism. It is a fundamental premise of modem labor law that
seeking to form unions is an appropriate use of workplaces, and it is a
commonplace of post-Lochner constitutional law that regulations allowing
people to do so are presumptively constitutional.
-Aron Fischer
40. See Richard B. Peterson et al., Strategies and Tactics in Union Organizing Campaigns,
31 INDUS. REL. 370, 374 (1992).
41. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(7)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (2000) ("[N]othing
in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the
purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ
members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization .... ).
42. See Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local
655, 39 F.3d 191, 195 (8th Cir. 1994) ("'A union picketing or boycotting a business which it has
not tried to organize (and in some cases cannot organize) nevertheless involves a labor dispute."'
(quoting Aarco, Inc. v. Baynes, 462 N.E.2d 1107, 1110 n.3 (Mass. 1984))).
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